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ABSTRACT: The Japan Society of Civil Engineers proposed to introduce the earthquake motion of level 2 to 
reflect the seismic forces of the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake in 1995. After the Great East Japan Earthquake 
in 2011, the undertaking of “human based” soft measures for evacuation in the case of tsunamis that exceed the 
conventionally assumed scale of level 1 was discussed; design methods that allow facilities to withstand tsunamis 
in addition to conventional seismic forces are in demand. The level 2 disasters experienced in Japan were 
incorporated into design concepts only after such large disasters occurred. However, actual level 2 disasters 
include events other than earthquakes and tsunamis. Increasing seawater temperature due to global warming will 
induce sea level rise, and typhoons will likely become larger in scale. Disastrous events that exceed conventional 
design conditions in high tides are more likely to occur. The three largest bay regions in Japan, where large 
hinterlands lie below sea level, require examination to clarify these risks. 
The authors reviewed various phenomena and present that risk management on the basis of level 2 disaster risks 
is of great importance. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Port facilities such as breakwaters and revetments in 
Japan are mostly designed to be safe against the 
maximum external wave force occurring during their 
normal service life of 50 years with a return period of 
50 years and against seismic forces with a return period 
of 75 years. These designs balancing economic 
feasibility against safety have been established based 
on the history of Japanese modern port construction. 
For Osaka Bay and Ise Bay, however, the return 
periods about 100 years have been used to set up higher 
sea embankments. Furthermore, the return periods of 
100–200 years have been adopted for many river dikes 
under direct government control. The Netherlands, 
where one-fourth of the land is below sea level, ensures 
safety by using a return period of up to 10,000 years. 
This concept may be introduced by considering an 
enormous sum of social damage when excessive 
external force is generated. 
The Japan Society of Civil Engineers proposed to 
introduce in design the earthquake motion of “level 2” 
to reflect the generated excessive seismic force 
appeared in the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake in 
1995. High seismic resistance quay walls with 
improved strength were introduced to ports, and some 
facilities were required to address the transport of 
emergency supplies and evacuees after a large-scale 
earthquake. In this case, the return period is reported to 
be several hundred to several thousand years. 
After the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011, the 
undertaking of “human based” soft measures for 
emergency evacuation in the case of a so-called level 2 
tsunamis that exceed the conventionally prospected in 
design (i.e., level 1 tsunami) has been discussed. In 
addition to it, as “facility-based” hard measures, design 
methods that allow facilities to toughly withstand level 
2 tsunamis have been studied so far in demand. 
The level 2 disasters experienced in Japan have been 
incorporated into design concepts step by step after 
such large disasters occurred. However, level 2 
disasters in society include events other than 
earthquakes and tsunamis. Increasing seawater 
temperature due to global warming will cause sea level 
rise. Typhoons will likely become larger in scale. 
Disastrous events that exceed conventional design 
conditions in high tides are more likely to occur. The 
three largest bay regions in Japan, Tokyo Bay, Ise Bay 
and Osaka Bay, where large hinterlands lie below sea 
level, require urgent studies to clarify these risks. 
The authors reviewed various phenomena related to 
disaster and present that risk management based on 
level 2 disaster risks is of great importance. 
 
2. HISTORY OF DISASTERS AND THE 
CONTRIBUTIONS OF CIVIL ENGINEERING 
 
2.1 Residential Areas and Disaster Risks 
Ever since rice cropping was introduced in Japan, 
Japanese people have found places to live on hills and 
other slightly elevated areas. They transformed the 
surrounding lowlands into rice paddies using irrigation 
from nearby streams and other sources. The land used 
for rice paddies was situated in the balance between 
locations where water was easily attainable and 
locations not vulnerable to floods or other disasters. 
The population of Japan gradually increased to about 
10 million by the end of warlike ages, roughly late 
sixteenth centuries, as a result of rice production. Japan 
had difficulty feeding its citizens because every time it 
rained and flooding occurred, the flood plains 
downstream of large rivers (i.e., alluvial plains) would 
turn to wetlands, which meant the majority of plains 
were unsuitable for rice cropping. However, once dikes 
were built to stabilize river channels, the protected 
lands came to be used for new rice paddies. The stable 
and deepened river channels enabled ship 
transportation. This reclamation of land and 
stabilization of river channels increased food 
production and reduced flood risks after the sixteenth 
century. In addition, the large-scale reclamation of 
tideland at the mouths of rivers also enabled an 
increase in food production, causing the population to 
rapidly grow from about 10 million to 30 million1). 
Throughout history, therefore, land use has taken into 
account disaster risks such as storm surges and floods. 
There has also been risk consciousness in areas prone 
to flood risk, such as reclaimed lands of the modern age 
where settlements have been developed along 
reclamation dikes on higher ground (Figure -1). 
 
 
 
Figure -1 Example of reclaimed land 
   (houses along reclamation dikes) Google 
 
Since the Meiji era (1868–1912), when modern civil 
engineering was introduced, large rivers have been 
improved so as to cause little flood damage, reducing 
the frequency of floods and storm-surge disasters. 
Figure-2 shows the number of fatalities from disasters 
after World War II.  Looking at the history of postwar 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
disasters, while annual fatalities have fluctuated 
between hundreds and thousands, the numbers have not 
remarkably increased, aside from level 2 disasters that 
go way beyond design assumptions, such as the Great 
Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake in 1995 or the Great East 
Japan Earthquake in 2011, since the social 
infrastructure was energetically improved during the 
rapid economic growth era in Japan.  
 
2.2 Zero-Risk Bias  
Present cities have been developed as extensions of 
wet-rice farming and the associated societies and lives 
historically developed on the flood plains around the 
mouths of large rivers. The subsequent advancement of 
modern civil engineering provided urban functions for 
these flood plains and reclaimed land during the 
postwar period. Former wetlands and other poorly 
drained areas are now used as prime lands following 
the advancement of urbanization due to increases in 
population. Although some small- and medium-sized 
rivers could still flood, in addition to the risk of 
storm-surge disasters, the majority of large-city 
residents have become less familiar with disasters since 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
there have been no opportunities to experience them. 
Improved river dikes, sea embankments, and 
drainage pump stations tend to make us forget about 
inherent land risks over time. Urbanization due to an 
increase in population leads to the use of former 
wetlands, resulting in the misleading safety myth (or 
zero-risk bias). Improved disaster safety has altered the 
awareness of residents, causing them to believe risks 
are nearly nonexistent. People are less serious about 
risks, trying to find problems with the government 
when something happens. In fact, they are less 
prepared for disasters now since it is impossible to 
understand disasters they have not experienced. As 
evidenced by the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake in 
1995 and the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011, 
however, level 2 disasters that go beyond the assumed 
disaster scale will cause catastrophic damage. 
Considering the current situation where poorly drained 
land originally unstable for use is fully utilized, 
disasters like floods, storm surges, or liquefaction due 
to earthquakes are likely to become more apparent in 
locations originally vulnerable to risk.  
 
Figure-2 Changes in the number of missing and dead from natural disasters 
 (modified part of a 2011 white paper on disaster prevention) 
2.3 Calculating the Return Period for Storm 
Surges and Other Disasters 
The current return period for storm surges is 
calculated to be as long as 1,000 years for the top end 
of the revetments in Tokyo using a storm surge height 
of 2.1 m with some margin allowances. In Nagoya and 
Osaka, it is calculated to be around 100 years—not 
necessarily long enough considering the seriousness of 
the disasters2). In Japan, the return period is often 
calculated to be between 100 and 200 years for most 
state-controlled river dikes. 
In the Netherlands, where a quarter of the land is 
below sea level, a maximum return period of 10,000 
years is used to ensure safety. This determines the 
optimal top-end height such that total costs are 
minimized on the basis of the construction costs for the 
dikes, the amount of damage when dikes are broken, 
and the frequency of the tide level. The embankments 
along the coast of the North Sea use a return period of 
10,000 years, while river dikes use a period of around 
1,250 years with the height calculated in relation to risk 
and economic performance. This idea considers the 
scale of risk in case excessive external force is applied. 
It is reported that the tide level comes under review 
once every five years depending on rises in sea level 
due to global warming or technical advancements, 
including estimations for storm surges3). 
Recently, however, improvement and maintenance 
costs have ballooned due to an increase in the amount 
of damage caused when disasters exceed the planned 
external force. Therefore, it has been planned that 
while the so-called level 1 storm surge (10,000 years 
for Dutch sea embankments) is to be blocked by the 
embankments, land use is to be adapted for any larger 
storm surges instead of allowing water to overflow to a 
certain extent by promoting salt-damage compensation 
for hinterland farmlands and improvements to houses 
resistant to floods4). 
This idea should be taken for granted considering it 
is not realistic to allocate a substantial budget toward 
improving facilities if one seriously thinks the risks of 
excessive external force resulting from global warming 
or other factors actually exist. Rather, this seems to be 
a means of hedging risks in case the return period of 
10,000 years is not protective.  
 
3. REAFFIRMATION OF LEVEL 2 
DISASTERS 
 
3.1 Introduction of Level 2 Earthquake Motion 
after the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake in 
1995 
As shown in Figure-2, while the number of disaster 
fatalities in Japan remained high during the postwar 
years, the number fell below 1,000 after Typhoon Vera 
in 1959. The Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake was the 
first catastrophe in 36 years. After the earthquake, the 
Japan Society of Civil Engineers issued the 
first-to-third proposals5) on the new notion of level 2 
earthquake motion for infrastructures. Technical 
Standards for port and Harbour Facilities in Japan 
introduced the concept of the level 2 earthquake motion 
in association with the proposals. The conventional 
technical standards were also based on the concept of 
seismic resistance for important facilities for which 
seismic performance should be improved. This was 
done by setting up cases where the importance factor 
used for improving the design calculated by the seismic 
coefficient method was 1.5. In response to the 
proposals from the Japan Society of Civil Engineers, 
the concept was summarized and used for facilities that 
were to be reinforced against earthquakes. 
Technical Standards for port and Harbour Facilities 
in Japan as applied to regular facilities required that 
structural stability be ensured against any level 1 
earthquake motion likely to occur during the facility’s 
in-service period and that the sound functioning of the 
facility not be impaired. The standards also required 
facilities subject to improved seismic resistance to 
minimize the damage from level 2 earthquake motions, 
have functions recover quickly following earthquakes, 
and retain their expected functions. 
  Technical Standards for port and Harbour Facilities 
in Japan took the minimum required functions by 
clarifying the concept of the level 2 earthquake motion 
and installing high seismic resistance  quay walls with 
improved strength in preparation for level 2 earthquake 
motion. Recently, however, the installation of such 
quay walls has not been sufficient to ensure port 
functions. The process of recovering ports has been 
forced to consider taking into chronological account 
not only the soundness and recovery of access roads 
from quay walls to the hinterland but also the recovery 
and resumption of organizations supporting port 
activities.  
Whatever the case may be, the Great Hanshin-Awaji 
Earthquake in 1995 led to the political recognition of 
level 2 earthquake motion and its inclusion in the 
technical standards for design. 
 
3.2 The Tsunami caused by the Great East Japan 
Earthquake in 2011 
The Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011 caused a 
tsunami that went beyond what was anticipated by both 
civil engineers and earthquake researchers. The 
tsunami that attacked the Pacific coast of the Tohoku 
region might even be called a “level 2 tsunami.” 
The Central Disaster Management Council, Cabinet 
Office, Government of Japan, established the 
Committee for Technical Investigation on 
Countermeasures against Earthquakes and Tsunamis 
based on the Lessons learned from the Great East Japan 
Earthquake in 2011 and concluded at the end of June 
2011 that “the largest-possible mega earthquakes and 
tsunamis should be considered from every possible 
angle.” In May 2013, the Committee submitted its final 
report on the largest possible mega earthquakes 
assumed to occur at the Nankai Trough6). The report 
indicates a need to consider tsunamis much larger than 
conventional ones by setting up new focal regions 
along the trough axis. 
In addition to the level 2 earthquake motion of the 
Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake in 1995, the need to 
consider level 2 tsunamis was discussed. The relevant 
organizations were asked to develop the basic concept 
that level 1 earthquake motions and tsunamis should be 
addressed through disaster prevention based on 
“facility-based” hard countermeasures. Disaster 
mitigation for level 2 earthquake motions and tsunamis 
should mainly be addressed with “human-based” soft 
measures. It is needless to say that countermeasures 
against such external forces are not realistic unless they 
are socioeconomically feasible. 
  The two catastrophes after Typhoon Vera were 
milestones in considering level 2 earthquake motions 
and tsunamis. As discussed in section 2, even those 
locations originally unavailable for use have now been 
fully taken advantage of, consequently increasing their 
vulnerability to unanticipated disasters. Once an 
unanticipated disaster occurs, catastrophic disaster 
could result.  
It is, therefore, important to consider every possible 
disaster outcome. Given that a 100-year return period is 
used for the top end of the current sea revetments in 
Nagoya and Osaka, a typhoon of the assumed level 2 
shown in Table-1 could possibly cause socio-enormous 
economic damage. This might indicate the need to 
consider level 2 disasters and some realistic actions 
against them. 
 
Table-1  Relationship between storm-surge level and 
assumed typhoon 
 
 
4. ACTIONS AGAINST LEVEL 2 DISASTERS 
 
4.1 The Probability of Level 2 Disasters  
The great loss of life that occurred after the Great 
Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake in 1995 and Great East 
Japan Earthquake in 2011 led the nation to recognize 
level 2 earthquake motions and tsunamis in considering 
how facilities should be built. However, there are many 
disasters other than earthquakes and tsunamis. An 
earthquake alone could cause many other 
underaddressed disasters such as fires in densely 
populated cities, petroleum tank fires in the coastal 
areas of large cities, and the influence of long-term 
ground movement. Apart from earthquakes and 
tsunamis, Japan, which is frequently attacked by 
typhoons, is vulnerable to storm surges, and 
countermeasures should be discussed as soon as 
possible with regard to level 2 disasters (the tail risks 
that are unlikely to occur but are irretrievable if they do 
occur). Actions to be taken against other unexpected 
level 2 disasters—including torrential rain, tornados, 
high waves, and volcanic explosions—must also be 
fully considered. 
Incidents with longer return periods are the historical 
phenomena no one has ever experienced, and when the  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
external force of a disaster exceeds disaster prevention, 
it tends to be less recognized socially. In fact, when a 
disaster occurs somewhere, people living in other areas 
often do not believe they could one day be victims as 
well. People see what they want to see. Actions to be 
taken against risks should be considered on the basis of 
probability and socio-economic loss. 
 
4.2 Global Warming Impact  
Global warming causes not only seawater expansion 
and surface elevation with an increase in seawater 
temperatures but catastrophic typhoon attacks, which 
lead to an increased risk of storm surges in the future.  
Yokota et al. examined the variable character of 
external forces in the coastal areas of the Kyushu 
region where global warming is expected to be 
influential on the basis of predicted climate values 
(MRI-AGCM3.2S)7). Figure-3 shows the frequency of 
typhoon passage by central pressure in the areas 
divided by longitude based on the data. Figure-3 shows 
that although the number of typhoons coming toward 
Japan will be reduced, there will be an increased 
number of the massive typhoons (central pressure of 
900 hPa or less) in green. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[
Figure-3 Comparison of typhoon passages by longitude resulting from global warming7) 
  
This means a level 2 storm surge is likely to attack 
Japan in the future, indicating a need to consider 
actions to be taken before and after such a disaster. 
Global warming also increases the frequency of 
torrential rain and causes phenomena that diverge 
significantly from conventional climatological 
statistics.  
Figure-4 shows the annual number of days when 
daily precipitation reached 400 mm, as determined by 
the Automated Meteorological Data Acquisition 
System (AMeDAS); the Japan Meteorological Agency 
included this information in its Climate Change 
Monitoring Report 20128). This indicates that the 
consecutive average (the horizontal line in the graph) 
rapidly increased in 2013 and that heavy rain has 
become more likely to occur over the last three 
decades. Although it is unknown whether this is a 
long-term trend resulting from global warming, such 
increases in torrential rain raise the probability of 
disasters like floods, landslides and tornados. 
 
 
Figure-4 Annual number of days when meteorological 
observation points (AMeDAS) recorded a daily 
precipitation of 400 mm or higher8) 
 
4.3 The Risk of Performance Degradation by 
Dilapidated Facilities 
Of the 35,000 km of coastline in Japan, the coastal 
protection area extends about 15,000 km. The total 
length of sea embankments (dikes, revetments and 
parapets) is said to be about 9,700 km9). The sea 
embankments were built after the enactment of the 
Coast Act (1956) and the damages resulting from the 
Great Chilean Earthquake (1960). Most are now at least 
50 years old, and the number of facilities needing 
upgrades or improvements is expected to increase. The 
extent to which the performance of the sea 
embankments is degraded by age in case of storm 
surges or tsunamis is often unknown. The 
embankments often have unanticipated vulnerability 
due to their age and are at risk for washouts even when 
the waves during storm surges or tsunamis do not reach 
the top-end height. Furthermore, storm surges or other 
waves that exceed the height of the sea embankments 
could progressively cause structural deterioration. Even 
at the stage where no overflow occurs, there is great 
concern that overtopping waves remain submerged for 
a long time and swamp the areas at the back where no 
drain ditch is appropriately provided or influent 
quantity exceeds pumping capability due to the back 
areas being below sea level. 
 
4.4 Preparation for Level 2 Disasters 
As mentioned above, level 2 disasters can also 
include storm surges, torrential rains, tornados, high 
waves and volcanic explosions. “Disasters always look 
different,” as they say, and disasters are in fact likely to 
sharp-shoot socially vulnerable positions. Regarding 
measures against earthquakes, the amended Building 
Standards Act improved the seismic performance of 
houses, while social capital facilities like roads and 
ports have sequentially improved their seismic 
performance. This does not, however, mean discussion 
has been advanced on the performance of local 
economies or the continuity of social activities taking 
into account the Business Continuity Plan (BCP) 
regarding large-scale earthquake disasters. Existing 
houses built according to the former Building 
Standards Act, as well as social capital facilities 
designed by earlier standards, often do not satisfy 
seismic performance. Thus, once a major earthquake 
occurs, fires could disrupt urban functions and 
distribution bottlenecks could disrupt the functions of 
cities or ports, even if individual seismic facilities were 
to remain sound. Earthquake disaster prevention will 
remain the priority issue, and regional disaster 
prevention, or mitigation capability, must be ensured 
from the perspective of the Business Continuity Plan 
(BCP) at the time of an earthquake. 
For the level 1 storm surge, the top-end height must 
be set up considering the drainage of overtopping into 
the landside, and the functions of the sea embankments 
(revetments) must be linearly ensured to protect the 
overall areas from the expected storm surges and 
waves. Current coast protection facilities have been 
upgraded to a certain extent. However, no sufficient 
plans or budget have been ensured for linear, integrated 
improvement works, including deterioration 
countermeasures and liquefaction countermeasures for 
settlement prevention at the time of an earthquake, and 
specific actions are apt to fall behind. Since the 
conventional level 1 disaster plan expects facilities to 
remain sound and flooding impact to be minor, there 
has been no sufficient discussion on plans for storm 
surges beyond level 1. Therefore, there is often a lack 
of discussion on the BCP and other issues. In the areas 
that include the three major Japanese ports, a storm 
surge  with the safer probability of 10% in 50 years 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
should not cause any greater damage than overtopping 
from the point of view of the population and industrial 
agglomeration. Necessary  “facility-related” hard 
improvements should be provided upon the review of 
the BCP if possible. 
  Takahashi et al. presented the relationship between 
the degree of disaster damage and the importance of 
facilities3). Figure-5 shows this relationship, rearranged 
by the authors of this paper, along with the return 
period and probability. Figure-5 organizes the 
performances of facilities at the time of disaster, and 
facilities of higher importance are required to be 
resistant to the phenomena of longer return periods. 
The service life of social capital facilities is often 
around 50 years. This is considered to be determined 
not from the engineering point of view but from the 
economic point of view. The actions used for design 
are usually considered in terms of level 1 external 
force, and the return period of 50 years is generally 
used for breakwaters. In this case, the probability of 
external force expected during the in-service period is 
0.64, indicating the external force is very likely to 
occur. In those important areas where safety must be 
ensured against level 2 disasters, the probability should 
be lowered to rare (probability of 10% in 50 years) or 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure-5 Relationship between the disaster performance matrix and frequency 
very rare (probability of 10% in 100 years), as shown 
in Figure-5, taking into consideration economic 
performance and social impact. 
There is, of course, always a potential risk of disaster 
beyond one’s assumptions, no matter how much safety 
has been improved by “facility-based” hard 
improvement. To hedge the risk in such cases, it is 
necessary to protect lives with advanced 
communication and evacuation procedures, achieve the 
most efficient possible BCP for economic losses within 
the recovery period, and establish a new framework 
including insurance for the portion of losses that cannot 
be covered by the BCP. This is also applicable to the 
general areas shown in Figure-5. If a disaster results 
from excessive external force, it should be necessary 
for social equity not only to ensure the safety of lives 
but to promote bailouts, including insurance coverage. 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
While earthquakes and tsunamis, including those 
occurring at Nankai Trough or directly under the 
Tokyo metropolitan area, are the urgent issues 
regarding level 2 disasters (tail risks), storm surges and 
high waves are similarly risky in probability, and their 
importance is never low in future social capital 
improvement. Another important issue to address is the 
recent increase in torrential rain that increases the 
likelihood of river flooding. Furthermore, there are 
several disaster risks of lower probability but 
catastrophe to be considered, including volcanic 
explosions and tornedos. The relevant parties and 
organizations as well as citizens should thus be ready 
for level 2 disasters that lay beyond expectations.  
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